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Terrorism and Political Violence Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: A Review of: "Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani. Islam and Modernism,"
John Zimmerman
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Islamic radicalism and global jihad by Devin R. Springer; James L. Regens; David N. Edger
Muhannad Salhi
2010
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Deconstructing the Concept of Jihad By the Radical Islamic Movements
Ahmad Khoirul Fata
the 1st Raden Intan International Conference on Muslim Societies and Social Sciences (RIICMuSSS 2019), 2020
This paper aims to criticize the religious understanding that becomes the basis of argumentation for radical Islamic movements. This study focuses on studying important issues about jihad (martyrdom) which were often misunderstood by the radical groups. Using a historical approach, it traces the historical roots of radicalism in Islam, examines its re-emergence in the modern time, and explore the basic characters of both classical and modern Islamic radicalism. This paper also uses a doctrinal-normative approach, focusing on verses of the Qur'an about jihad, in order to understand the core arguments used by them in carrying out their actions. The existing studies argued that the earliest radical group in Islam dated back to the 1st century Hijra (7th century), by the rise of the Khawarij group. Yet, in modern times, it is Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Jamati-i Islami that have provided much inspiration for the emergence of contemporary radical movements, both of which use the concept of jihad, as a response to the hegemony of modern Western civilization. But unfortunately their reading of the jihad concept is too literal, partial, and not context-sensitive.
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Politics of Islamic Jihad
Kent Bob Huzen
2008
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Al Qaeda's Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad
Paul Kamolnick
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2013
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A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (2009a)
Joas Wagemakers
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2009
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Roots of Militant Jihadism: Politics and Tradition in Islam (A)
Leslie Terebessy
It is said that militant jihadism “has nothing to do with Islam,” that it is a recent phenomenon. This is the mantra of apologists. An examination shows that radical Islam has its roots to a remarkable extent in traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. Hawkish ulema treat wars of aggression against “infidels” as lawful and even required. The book of Allah teaches reconciliation but hawkish ulema reinterpreted it as a permit for aggression, if not repression. When dynastic rule replaced the caliphate, the official “interpretation” of revelation also changed. This alteration was a reflection of the politicisation of revelation. Hawkish ulama reinterpreted fighting in self-defense as jihad al-talab: the propagation of religion through wars of aggression, prohibited in revelation. By rendering unlawful wars of aggression lawful, hawkish ulama arrogated to themselves the right to judge between lawful and unlawful, a right that belongs exclusively to Allah. In this way militant ulema warped the teaching of revelation, and tainted it with shirk. They replaced Islam with political Islam. To politicise the knowledge of revelation, they “supplemented” revelation with “explanatory” books, the prophetic traditions. Unfortunately, the “supplementary” books of “revelation” did not “explain” revelation. On the contrary, they altered its teaching. For the Book of Allah emphasizes justice, morality, and rationality. But there are no books on these themes in Bukhari. Unlike the Book of Allah, the traditions ascribed to the prophet rob the teaching of revelation of its justice, ethics, and rationality. They strip Islam of its universality. They attribute a militant tenor to Islam. The misinterpretation of revelation spawned aggressive jihadism. The misinterpretation was exacerbated by the repression of reason, which also aided recourse to the teaching of abrogation. The repression of reason brought a range of aberrations, undermining the reliability of traditional exegesis (tafsir) and jurisprudence (fiqh). The emergence of militant jihadism was augmented by the treatment of the traditions as “equal” to the Book of Allah. Treating tradition as “revelation” fused and confused tradition with revelation, the rulings of Allah with the perceptions of the ulama. Hawkish ulama assert that: “tradition is revelation and a part of the Book of Allah.” Militant jihadism is characterised by the perception that the sharia is to rule the world. This misperception, a product of the corruption of the knowledge of revelation, encourages radicalisation. For “jihad” is a struggle for betterment. This is the greater jihad. Fighting in self-defense is the lesser jihad. Revelation neither prescribes nor permits aggressive jihad, a juristic invention. Unfortunately, militant ulama transformed the right to self-defense into a requirement to “propagate” Islam through wars of aggression and the perpetration of war crimes, into a sixth pillar of Islam. This represents a corruption of the teaching of revelation. Hawkish ulama transformed the religion of peace into a religion of war by asserting that the “peace verses” were “abrogated” by the verses of the sword. This epic corruption of the teaching of revelation was reinforced by traditions that endorse militant renditions of Islam. Jihadism resulted from the expansionary aspirations of rulers, fuelled by ulema willing to reinterpret revelation to furnish a “religious” justification for waging unlawful wars of aggression, under the rubric of “propagating” Islam by the sword. The transformation was underpinned by recourse to a vision in which the dar al-Islam or the realm of peace is in a life and death struggle with the dar al-kufr, the realm of unbelief. This perception is alien to the teaching of revelation. It is a variant of the “clash of civilizations” thesis, promulgated by Samuel Huntington. The “clash of civilizations” thesis is being used to justify the “war on terror.” It reflects a Hobbesian perspective, which perceives the world as a “war of all against all.” Jihadists present a threat to safety. For the jihadist acts as judge, jury and executioner. This requires audacity. The jihadist does not respond to reason. He or she is propelled by desires for revenge and power. He or she respects force. He or she practices the use of force in religion, which is contrary to the teaching of revelation, and follows what he or she is told without hesitation. An effective response requires effective enforcement. A long-term response requires a reform of traditional Muslim education. What Muslims are taught and the way they are taught require attention. For the present approach is faulty. There is not enough emphasis on reflection. There is excessive rote learning. There is excessive regurgitation. The teaching of predestination (jabr) and the teaching of abrogation also corrupted Muslim education. Muslims that believe in predestination perceive themselves as “machines,” without free will, programmed by Allah to do everything, not excluding the perpetration of crimes. Muslims are taught that the verses of reconciliation in revelation were abrogated by the ayah as-sayf (9:5) and that Allah expects Muslims to wage aggressive war (jihad al-talab) against non-Muslims even when Muslims are not being attacked. These corrupt perceptions are a relic of the past, the heritage of anti-rationalism, shutting the gates to reasoning, and taqlid. Renewal requires the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason. Muslim thought requires reform. For knowledge of revelation was tarnished by problematic presuppositions. An example of a problematic practice is taqlid, the unquestioning following of tradition. Examples of unwarranted presuppositions encompass the perceptions that revelation features “unclear” verses or that revelation requires being “explained” by tradition. An example of a flawed teaching is that of abrogation. Another problematic assumption is the perception of tradition as “revelation.” By treating tradition as revelation – equal to the Quran – the exegetes abolish the difference between the words of God and the words of people. The amalgamation of tradition with revelation was a grave error. The “crisis” in the Muslim mind is a paralysis. For Muslims became enchanted by tradition to the extent they are willing to follow tradition even against reason, not to mention revelation. This requires reflection. It requires rethinking tradition and its relationship to revelation. Renewal also requires the rehabilitation of reason and the reform of education. Jihad means to “endeavour” or “struggle.” There is a difference between the greater and the lesser jihad. Armed struggle – in self-defense – is the lesser jihad. The effort to become better is the “greater jihad.” The transformation of defensive into offensive jihad was a juristic error. As a result, jihad is associated with terror. Politics corrupted the knowledge of revelation by tainting the exegesis of revelation. Using flawed reasoning, jurists reached a corrupt rendering of revelation. This rendering requires expanding the “realm of peace” at the expense of the “realm of war” by force. The alleged “abrogation” of the peace verses robbed Islam of its teaching of peace, corrupted the knowledge of revelation and generated confusion. The process was buttressed by recourse to bellicose ahadith, in defiance of the teaching of revelation. Politicised ulama accomplished this transformation by asserting that the peace verses of revelation were abrogated by the ayah as-sayf. Fighting in self-defense was reinvented as aggressive, pre-emptive warfare. Revelation, however, prohibits wars of aggression. Aggressive jihad endeavours to establish the rule of shariah everywhere. A distinguishing trait of the jihadist is sparse knowledge of revelation. This is a result of “traditional education,” of excessive focus on tradition at the expense of revelation and a deactivation of reason, inaugurated by the closure of the gates to ijtihad. There is excessive emphasis on rote learning, and not enough on understanding. The de-emphasis on thought in Muslim education was a legacy of the clashes between the traditionists and the rationalists. The traditionists follow Islam through the mediation of tradition. But Islam does endorse recourse to “middlemen.” It asks us to follow revelation without relying on mediators. Rationalists, by contrast, follow revelation understood by reason. Rather than follow revelation, as instructed by revelation, Muslims turned from revelation to tradition. Muslims became “traditional.” Rather than follow the Book of Allah, Muslims follow the non-revealed traditions of persons. Muslims became focused upon preserving the status quo rather than pursue reform. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09Y9BX3VV https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B09Y9BX3VV https://www.amazon.ca/dp/B09Y9BX3VV https://www.amazon.com.au/dp/B09Y9BX3VV
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Irm Haleem
COURSE DESCRIPTION This class examines radical Jihadi discourse in both conceptual and comparative terms. As such, the class does not focus on the formation or trajectory of a specific Jihadi group or movement, but takes the general themes of Jihadi groups and movements and compares them to the general themes of radical groups and movements of other religious, ideological, or political leanings. The point of such a comparative analysis is to underscore the fact that radical Islamic justifications for violence and monstrosity are not unique only to the Islamic context. Rather, these justifications reflect broader, more universal and ubiquitous themes. In fact, the readings in this class shed light on different religious and secular (political) groups and movements that share the general themes and rationale for violence that are found in radical Islamic (Jihadi or Jihadist) groups and movements. As such, students in this class will come to appreciate the common overarching themes in radical Jewish and Christian groups, radical secular groups such as Nazi and Neo-Nazi groups, and even common themes in international conventions such as the Just War Doctrine. In making sense of the commonalities of themes in ideologically and contextually different groups and movements, the readings in this class engage in a conceptual analysis of the themes and rationale for violence that are universal and ubiquitous. As such, the students come to appreciate the significance of notions such as ‘construction of evil’, ‘demonization’, ‘Divine justifications’ and ‘divinity’ at large; as well as notions such as ‘necessity’, ‘morality’, and ‘duty’. In understanding of the significance and centrality of these notions in the justifying rhetoric of all radical groups and movements (beyond just Jihadi group and movements), students will come understand how these notions are used to pacify moral objections to violence on the part of both the recruited as well as the audiences (bystanders) of radical groups and movements. Through such a conceptual analysis, the class thus offers a broad look at the rationale and dynamics that lead to the perpetuation and normalization of violence worldwide, as well as to the rationale of Jihadist Strategic Thought and Practice.
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Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices (2011b)
Joas Wagemakers
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2011
This article deals with the attempts by the radical Islamist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to reclaim scholarly authority over jihad, a phenomenon he has helped promote but that has led to excesses he disagrees with and has increasingly become the prerogative of fighters instead of scholars. These attempts by al-Maqdisi to reassert his own jihadi authority are expressed through criticism of certain jihadi practices and advice to jihad fighters. Because al-Maqdisi has been in the forefront of radical scholars calling for jihad, his criticism has been dismissed by some jihadis as revisionism of his earlier views and as the words of a man lacking any fighting experience himself. This article argues that al-Maqdisi's criticism of certain jihadi practices does not constitute revisionism of his earlier views but is an effort to take greater scholarly control of the jihadi trend that he has partly inspired but which—in the hands of militants—has also developed beyond what he sees as useful and even Islamically legitimate.
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Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies: The Historical Journey of Jihad from the Late Antique Period to the 21st Century
Chandar Lal
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